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Public Sector Union Representation




During the past decade, Pennsylvania's labor law has furthered
public employees' rights to organize and bargain collectively.' Public
employees are no longer isolated individuals dealing with employers, but
are increasingly united in organizations. Unlike private sector employ-
ees,2 however, public employees have not been specifically accorded the
right to union representation during investigatory interviews that may
result in disciplinary action. Nevertheless, the right to union representa-
tion at investigatory interviews is important for public employees,
unions, and employers.
Collective bargaining in the public sector, which is still a relatively
new concept, suffers from a paucity of interpretative decisions. Moreov-
er, the impact of existing decisional law is limited by individual state or
local statutes, court decisions, executive orders, and attorney general
opinions 3 that vary from one state to another.' In the private sector,
however, precedent is virtually unlimited because the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA)5 is interpreted through a centralized agency, the
* B.A., Thiel College; M.P.A., The Pennsylvania State University; J.D., Vanderbilt
University; Ass't Att'y General, Pa. Governor's Office, Bureau of Labor Relations; Mem-
ber, Pennsylvania Bar. The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and do not
necessarily represent policy or positions of the Pennsylvania Governor's Office, Bureau of
Labor Relations.
1. The Act of June 24, 1968, P.L. 237, No. Ill (Act 11), established police and
firemen's rights to organize and bargain collectively. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 217.1-.10
(Purdon Supp. 1977-78). All other Pennsylvania public employees were granted the right to
organize and bargain collectively by the Act of July 23, 1970, P.L. 563, No. 195 (Act 195).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.101-.2301 (Purdon Supp. 1977-78).
2. The United States Supreme Court in NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251
(1975), acknowledged the right of private sector employees to union representation when an
employer's investigation may reasonably result in disciplinary action.
3. At least 45 states provide some form of collective bargaining for either all or a
portion of their public employees. 51 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 501 (1977).
4. See Drachman & Ambash, Is Looking Up Case Precedent in Other Jurisdictions
Worthwhile in Public Sector LaborRelations ?-A Management Perspective, 6 J.L. & EDuC.
209 (1977).
5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1970).
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). 6 Private sector precedents pro-
vide reliable, if not analogous authority to public sector tribunals when
the statutory language in both sectors is parallel. 7 Blind deference, how-
ever, is unwarranted unless the legislature intended that the statute be so
construed. 8 In Pennsylvania, private sector precedent "may provide some
guidance," but it is also necessary to consider "the distinctions that
necessarily must exist between legislation primarily directed to the pri-
vate sector and that for public employees. "9
II. Relevance of the Weingarten Decision to the Public Sector
An example of guidance from the private sector is provided by the
Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc. o that an em-
ployee has a qualified right to union representation during investigatory
interviews. II The right arises when the employee reasonably believes the
investigation will result in disciplinary action,12 but only if the employee
specifically requests union representation. 13 When an employee demands
union representation, the employer has two alternatives. First, he may
pursue his investigation without an interview.' 4 Second, he may allow
union representation, but restrict the union representative's participation.
There is no obligation to bargain with the union at the interview, and the
employer may insist upon hearing only the employee's version. 
15
A qualified right to union representation during investigatory inter-
views can be justified by its elimination of the power imbalance that
6. Id. § 153.
7. See, e.g., Fire Fighters Union, Local 1186 v. City of Vallejo, 12 Cal. 3d 608, 526
P.2d 971, 116 Cal. Rptr. 507 (1974); Kerrigan v. City of Boston, 361 Mass. 24, 278 N.E.2d
387 (1972); Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Detroit, 391 Mich. 44, 214 N.W.2d 803
(1974); Kahn, Is Looking Up Case Precedent in Other Jurisdictions Worthwhile in Public
Sector Labor Relations ?-The Perspective of a Neutral, J.L. & EDuc. 221 (1977).
8. The California Agricultural Labor Relations Act, for example, provides that the
Agricultural Labor Relations Board "shall follow applicable precedents of the National
Labor Relations Act as amended." 44 CAL. STAT. ANN. § 1148 (1977).
9. Pa. LRB v. State College Educ. Ass'n, 461 Pa. 494, 499, 337 A.2d 262, 264(1975).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated,
We emphasize that we are not suggesting that the experience gained in the private
sector is of no value here, rather we are stressing that analogies have limited
application and the experience gained in the private employment sector will not
necessarily provide an infallible basis for a monolithic model for public employ-
ment.
Id. at 500, 337 A.2d at 264-65. Borough of Wilkinsburg v. Sanitation Dep't, 463 Pa. 521,345
A.2d 641 (1975); Pa. LRB v. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Emp., 22
Pa. Commw. Ct. 376, 348 A.2d 921 (1975).
10. 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
11. Id. at 253. The Court discussed the nature and extent of the union representation
right as developed by the NLRB in NLRB v. Quality Mfg. Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 197 (1972),
enforcement denied, 481 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 420 U.S. 276 (1975) and NLRB v.
Mobil Oil Corp., 196 N.L.R.B. 1052 (1972), enforcement denied, 482 F.2d 842 (7th Cir.
1973).
12. 420 U.S. at 256.
13. Id. at 257.
14. Id. at 258-59.
15. Id. at 259-60.
arises when employees confront employers without assistance. 16 A union
representative's presence shields an employee from any threat to employ-
ment while safeguarding the bargaining unit's interests.
Weingarten's implications for the private sector are obvious.' 7 Its
significance to the public sector, however, is also important. Like their
private sector counterparts, public employers confront employees in dis-
ciplinary situations during which union representation may be requested.
It is essential, therefore, to determine whether the right to union represen-
tation exists in the public sector. Before such a determination can be
made, however, it is necessary to outline the perimeters of the union
representation right as it exists in the private sector.
A. The Right to Union Representation: A Subjective Test
The union representation right at an investigatory interview depends
on a subjective rather than objective test-the employee must reasonably
believe that discipline may result.18 Thus, the employer who desires to
avoid unfair labor practice charges would be wise to err on the side of
union representation. It is clear that the right to union representation does
not arise during a routine employer-employee conversation because no
reason to fear disciplinary action exists in such a situation.19 Neverthe-
less, a subjective test is too easily satisfied, even if the nature of the
16. Western Electric Co., 205 N.L.R.B. 195 (1973); New York Telephone Co., 203
N.L.R.B. 1153 (1973); NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 446 (1973), denying
enforcement, 485 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1973), reversed, 420 U.S. 251 (1975); National Can
Corp., 200 N.L.R.B. 1116 (1972); Western Electric Co., 198 N.L.R.B. 623 (1972); Mobil Oil
Corp., 196 N.L.R.B. 1052 (1972), enforcement denied, 482 F.2d 842 (7th Cir. 1971); Lafayet-
te Radio Electronics, 194 N.L.R.B. 491 (1971); Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 192 N.L.R.B.
834 (1971); Texaco, Inc., 179 N.L.R.B. 976 (1969); United Aircraft Corp., 179 N.L.R.B. 935
(1969), aff'd on another ground, 440 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1971); Wald Manufacturing Co., 176
N.L.R.B. 839 (1969), aff'd on other grounds, 426 F.2d 1328 (6th Cir. 1970); Dayton Typog-
raphic Services, Inc., 176 N.L.R.B. 357 (1969); Jacobe-Pearson Ford, Inc., 172 N.L.R.B.
594 (1968); Texaco, Inc., 168 N.L.R.B. 361 (1967), enforcement denied, 408 F.2d 142 (5th
Cir. 1969); Chevron Oil Co., 168 N.L.R.B. 574 (1967); Electric Motors & Specialties, Inc.,
149 N.L.R.B. 1432 (1964); Dobbs Houses, Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. 1565 (1964); Ross Gear &
Tool Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 1012 (1945), enforcement denied, 158 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1947). See
generally Comment, Employee's Right to Presence of Union Representative at an Investigat-
ory Interview, 14 DUQ. L. REV. 257 (1975); Comment, Employer Must Allow Union Stew-
ard's Presence at Interview where Employee has Reasonable Fear of Discipline, 6 SETON
HALL L. REV. 514 (1975); Comment, Employee Right to Union Representation During
Employer Interrogation, 7 U. TOL. L. REV. 298 (1975).
17. 420 U.S. at 260-64.
18. Id. at 256. In Quality, the NLRB stated, " 'Reasonable ground' will of course be
measured, as here, by objective standards under all the circumstances of the case." NLRB
v. Quality Mfg. Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 197, 198 n.3 (1972), enforcement denied, 481 F.2d 1018
(4th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 420 U.S. 276 (1975). The test, however, is actually subjective, since it
depends on the employee's beliefs.
19. We would not apply the rule to such run-of-the-mill shop floor conversations
as, for example, the giving of instructions or training or needed correction of work
techniques. In such cases there cannot normally be any reasonable basis for an
employee to fear that any adverse impact may result from the interview, and thus
we would see no reasonable basis for him to seek the assistance of his representa-
tive.
NLRB v. Quality Mfg. Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 197, 199 (1972), quoted with approval in NLRB v.
J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 257-58 (1975).
interview is nonaccusatory.2° Moreover, the right to union representation
may arise during seemingly innocuous discussions concerning the em-
ployer's distribution of such benefits as overtime and holiday pay, be-
cause disciplinary actions may result from such conversations even if they
cannot be characterized as discharges, suspensions, or warnings.
2'
1. Advantages of Subjective Test to Employees.-Employees
confronted with possible discipline must be able to present their case
effectively. This objective may be accomplished by the presence of a
union representative who is more familiar with the contract, rules, and
employer customs than an employee who is intimidated by both his
predicament and meeting his employer on unequal terms .22 Moreover,
union representation deters disparate treatment of employee-offenders by
insuring that equal punishment is dispensed for identical infractions.23
Finally, the union representative can safeguard the interests of other
employees by informing them of employer decisions.
2: Advantages of Subjective Test to Unions.-Presence at inves-
tigatory interviews gives the union information to detect potential griev-
ances 24 and problem areas relevant to future negotiations. The right is
analogous to permitting union presence at grievance adjustments .25
20. In Weingarten, for example, the employer's investigatory interview was essential-
ly nonaccusatory until the employee made statements about her right to free lunches that the
employer challenged. 420 U.S. at 255-56.
21. Discipline in its broadest sense may include any tangible or intangible loss an
employee suffers during the employer-employee relationship, such as demotions or
downgrading. Thompson Bros. Boat Mfg. Co., 55 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 69 (1970)
(Moberly, Arb.); Duquesne Light Co., 48 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 1108 (1967) (McDermott,
Arb.); Allied Tube and Conduit Corp., 48 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 454 (1967) (Kelleher,
Arb.); National Carbide Co., 47 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 154 (1966) (Kesselman, Arb.);
Albert F. Goetze, Inc., 47 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 67 (1966) (Rosen, Arb.); H. K. Porter
Co., 46 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 1098 (1966) (Dworkin, Arb.). Other examples of discipline
include transfers, withholding monetary benefits without actual suspension, requiring em-
ployees to present a medical certificate before returning to work after an alleged illness, and
forcing public apologies. Parkside Manor, 53 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 410 (1969) (Belcher,
Arb.); City of Stamford, 49 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 1061 (1967) (Johnson, Arb.); Continen-
tal Moss-Gordin Gin Co., 46 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 1071 (1966) (Williams, Arb.); Celotex
Corp., 36 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 517 (1961) (Dworkin, Arb.); Reynolds Metals Co., 22
Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 528 (1954) (Klamon, Arb.); Armstrong Tire & Rubber Co., 18 Lab.
Arb. & Disp. Settl. 544 (1952) (Ralston, Arb.).
22. See Thrifty Drug Stores, Co., Inc., 50 Lab. Arb. & Disp Settl. 1253 (1968) (Jones,
Arb.); Novo Indus. Corp., 41 Lab. Arb. & Disp Settl. 921 (1963) (Gill, Arb.).
23. See S. SLICHTER, J. HEALEY & E. LIVERNASH, THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING ON MANAGEMENT 625, 631 (1960).
24. One commentator has noted in the grievance procedure context,
Grievances may relate to the establishment of new rates and the adjustment of old;
to rulings on seniority, layoffs, and rehires; to discharges and other disciplinary
measures; to merit-inc'eases, transfers, promotions; to the operation of an incen-
tive system and countless other measures. Whether they are cast in the form of an
interpretation of an agreement or not, any adjustments made of these questions
affect the whole plant. The rulings tend to become precedents and may eventually
constitute a body of industrial common law supplementing the formal agreement.
Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947(pt. 2), 61 HARV. L. REV.
274, 302 (1948).
25. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970). This prohibits direct bargaining between employer and
Union presence during an investigatory interview may be considered
part of its duty as bargaining agent to enforce the collective bargaining
agreement's provisions and resolve disputes arising thereunder. 26 The
union's right to bargain with the employer on wages, hours, and working
conditions does not cease with the contract's signing. Bargaining is a
continuing relationship requiring each party to resolve issues arising
during the contract's term. 27 Union presence at investigatory interviews is
part of this continuing duty to bargain over the employee's job rights.
3. Legitimate Employer Prerogatives.-Employers insist that
union presence at investigatory interviews results in disruption of opera-
tions and challenges their authority. Indeed, employers have a significant
interest in preserving their power to investigate working conditions or job
performance absent union interference. An employer would not desire a
union representative who perceived his role as counsel in a criminal case.
Employers fear situations in which the union representative instructs the
employee how to respond. These fears may be compounded by the
employer's interest in avoiding unnecessary conferences resulting in
disciplinary delays.
This must be contrasted with the potential benefits that might be
offered. Union presence may generate a better understanding of the
dispute. A good union representative may assist by discouraging frivol-
ous grievances that would result without early union involvement .28 Early
review affords an opportunity to correct errors that might produce ill
feelings among employees. Moreover, informal consideration of the
merits of a potential grievance may reduce the parties' costs in the
grievance procedure.
2 9
B. Contours and Limits of the Right to Union Representation
However legitimate an employer's fears of union representation at
investigatory interviews may be, the concerns are minimized by the
detailed explanation of the contours and limits of the right to union
employee to prevent the undermining of the union's position and possible jeopardy to other
employees' rights. See Duvin, The Duty to Bargain: Law in Search of Policy, 64 COLUM. L.
REV. 248, 273 (1964).
26. Comment, Union Presence in Disciplinary Meetings, 41 U. CHIi. L. REV. 329, 341
(1974).
27. NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 436 (1967); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.
41, 46 (1957).
28. See Caterpillar Tractor Co., 44 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Setti. 647,651 (1965) (Dworkin,
Arb.).
29. Inadequate investigation of grievances by some unions has been considered a
factor in the overload that plagues arbitration. Ross, Distressed Grievance Procedures and
their Rehabilitation, in LABOR ARBITRATION AND INDUSTRIAL CHANGE, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
16TH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 104, 107, 109 (1963). When
the grievance procedure is overloaded, both employer and union are tempted to engage in
"horse-trading" of grievances, a result sometimes harmful to individual interests. Id. at
Ill.
presence provided by Weingarten and later decisions. 30 The right inheres
in the NLRA's guarantee of employee rights to act in concert for mutual
aid and protection. 31 Denial of this right interferes with, restrains, and
coerces employees and thus results in an unfair labor practice. 32 Refusing
an employee's union representation request is a serious violation of this
right. This compels the employee to appear unassisted at an interview and
possibly jeopardizes his job security.
33
It is the employee's affirmative responsibility, however, to request
union representation. 3 The employer has no obligation to inform the
employee of the union representation right. Moreover, the employee may
voluntarily forgo the right and, if preferred, participate in an investigatory
interview unaccompanied by a union representative.
The right to union representation, once asserted, includes the right to
confer with a union representative before the interview. 35 To represent
effectively an employee "too fearful or inarticulate to relate accurately
the incident being investigated" and to be "knowledgeable" to "assist
the employee by eliciting favorable facts, and . . . getting to the bottom
of the incident," the union representative must be able to consult prior to
the interview. 36 In this way, the union representative can learn the
employee's version and gain familiarity with the facts. A fearful or
inarticulate employee may be more likely to discuss the incident fully and
accurately with a union representative. Weingarten did not deny union
representatives the opportunity of consulting prior to the interview.
37
Moreover, the union as well as the employee, may request prior consulta-
tion. 38
The employer, however, need not postpone an investigatory inter-
view merely because the requested union representative is unavailable.
39
The reason for the unavilability is irrelevant, especially when another
union representative is available and could have been requested. Moreov-
er, the employer is not obligated to suggest or secure alternate union
representation.
40
Since the exercise of the right may interfere with legitimate employ-
er prerogatives, 41 the employer has no obligation to justify a refusal to
30. NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
31. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
32. Id.
33. MobilOil Corp., 196 N.L.R.B. 1052 (1972), enforcementdenied, 482F.2d842(7th
Cir. 1973).
34. NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 257 (1975). The union representative
right cannot be equated with the Miranda warnings that must be furnished to an arrestee
under the Supreme Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
35. Climax Molybdenum Co., 94 L.R.R.M. 1177 (1977).
36. NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 263 (1975).
37. Id.
38. Climax Molybdenum Co., 94 L.R.R.M. 1177 (1977).
39. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 94 L.R.R.M. 1200 (1977).
40. Id. at 1201.
41. NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 258 (1975).
allow union representation. The employer may simply advise that the
interview will not proceed unless the employee is willing to enter the
interview unaccompanied. The employee may refrain from participating.
This protects the employee's right, but relinquishes any benefit that could
be derived from the interview.42 The employer is free to act on informa-
tion from other sources. The employer, however, cannot threaten,
coerce, or cajole the employee to remain without a union representative.43
He cannot threaten that the right's exercise will lead to more severe
discipline or that the employee's fate will be in more capricious and
hostile hands.
44
A final limitation on the right to union presence during an investigat-
ory interview is that the employer has no duty to bargain with any union
representative who might attend.45 Even though the union representative
could attempt to clarify the facts, the employer may insist on hearing only
the employee's account.
C. Fairness and Due Process: A Rationale for Union Representation
Perhaps the best rationale in support of a right to union representa-
tion at investigatory interviews is that it assures fairness.' The key to
fairness is not the mere resolution of factual issues, but the process used
by the employer that makes a factual resolution possible. Admittedly, the
process of union representation at investigatory interviews is less efficient
than investigation without an interview or an interview without union
presence. Nevertheless, the process is not intended to promote efficiency,
but to protect the employee who reasonably believes that disciplinary
action is imminent. The union representation right recognizes higher
values than speed, convenience, and efficiency. It safeguards employees
from unresponsive employers and protects the bargaining unit's fairness
and due process interests.
D. Sanctions for Failure to Accord the Right to Union Representation
1. Grievance Arbitration.-Because the right to union representa-
tion during investigatory interviews is essential to fair fact-finding, it is
not surprising that this right fully comported with actual labor relations
practice before the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. J. Weingarten,
Inc. 47 and was expressly included in many collective bargaining agree-
merits. 48 Even when not expressly provided for by contract, a well-
42. Mobil Oil Corp., 196 N.L.R B. 1052 (1972), enforcement denied, 482 F.2d 842 (7th
Cir. 1973).
43. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 94 L.R.R.M. 1305 (1977).
44. Id. at 1305.
45. NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 259 (1975).
46. See F. ELKOURI & E.A. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 632-34 (3d ed. 1973)
[hereinafter cited as ELKOURI], Comment, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 329, supra note 26, at 338.
47. 420 U.S. 251, 267 (1975).
48. See [1977] 1 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACTS (BNA)
21:22, 23.
established current of arbitral authority sustained the right at investigatory
interviews from which discipline could result.49 Contractual due process
requires that procedural requirements for discipline be followed. With or
without specific contractual language, arbitrators have found that union
representation rights are closely allied with due process. Just as arbitrator
Walter Boles found that "a 'just cause' basis for consideration of discipli-
nary action is, absent a clear proviso to the contrary, implied in a modern
collective bargaining agreement,''50 the union representation right may
also be implied in any fair grievance procedure. Arbitrators have refused
to sustain disciplinary action when it fails to comport with procedural due
process. 51 Thus, refusal to attend an investigatory interview without
union representation does not constitute insubordination.
52
2. Unfair Labor Practices.-Failure to accord the right to union
representation upon request at an investigatory review may constitute an
unfair labor practice. The keystone of the private sector right is the
NLRA's guarantee of employees' associational economic rights, 53 which
are effectuated through the NLRA's unfair labor practices section.
54
There is also a sound statutory basis under section 159(a) for the union
representation right. 55 Union presence may be considered part of its
general bargaining duty. The union's claim is further supported by its
right to information essential to its bargaining function. Presence at
investigatory interviews provides the union with this type of information.
III. The Right to Union Representation in Pennsylvania's Public Sector
It would be anomalous to suggest that the rationale for union repre-
sentation during investigatory interviews in the private sector is inappo-
49. See Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 67 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 352 (1976) (Mar-
kowitz, Arb.); Combustion Engineering, Inc., 67 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 349 (1976)
(Clarke, Arb.); Rexall Drug Co., 65 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 1101 (1975); Clow Corp., 64
Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 668 (1975) (Cohen, Arb.); Babcock & Wilcox Co., 61 Lab. Arb. &
Disp. Settl. 360 (1973) (Ells, Arb.); Chevron Chemical Co., 60 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 1066
(1973) (Merril, Arb.); Universal Oil Prods. Co., 60 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 832 (1973)
(Schieber, Arb.); Allied Paper Co., 53 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 226 (1969) (Holly, Arb.);
Thrifty Drug Stores Co., Inc., 50 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 1253 (1968) (Jones, Arb.); Waste
King Universal Prods. Co., 46 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 283 (1966) (Petree, Arb.); Dallas
Morning News, 40 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 619 (1963) (Rohman, Arb.); The Arcrods Co., 39
Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 784 (1962) (Teple, Arb.); Valley Iron Works, 33 Lab. Arb. & Disp.
Settl. 769 (1960) (Anderson, Arb.); Schlitz Brewing Co., 33 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 57
(1959) (Meyers, Arb.); Singer Mfg. Co., 28 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 570 (1957) (Cahn, Arb.);
Braniff Airways, Inc., 27 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 892 (1957) (Williams, Arb.); John Lucas
& Co., 19 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 344 (1952) (Reynolds, Arb.).
50. Cameron Iron Works, Inc., 25 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 295, 301 (1955) (Boles,
Arb.).
51. ELKOURI, supra note 46, at 127-29.
52. Id. See also Nelson, Union Representation During Investigatory Interviews, 31
ARB. J. 181 (1976); Nelson, Union Representation During Management Investigations of
Alleged Rule Infractions, 26 LAB. L.J. 37 (1975).
53. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
54. Id. § 158(a).
55. Id. § 159(a).
site to the public sector. Public sector employees, however, are not
governed by the provisions of the NLRA that make the right to union
representation possible. Nevertheless, Pennsylvania's labor relations stat-
utes are sufficiently similar to the NLRA possibly to guarantee the right to
union representation at investigatory interviews. The right also receives at
least limited support from the decisions of the Pennsylvania Labor Rela-
tions Board (PLRB).
A. Statutory Basis for the Right
1. Pennsylvania Public Employe Relations Act (Act 195).-The
Pennsylvania Public Employee Relations Act (Act 195)6 governs labor
relations for all public employees except police and firemen." Since its
statutory language is patterned after much of the NLRA, private sector
interpretations of the NLRA provide some guidance to the meaning of
Act 195, but are not controlling .
8
Section 157 of the NLRA, which supports the private sector's union
representation right,5 9 provides that
[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargain-
ing or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the
right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the
extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requir-
ing membership in a labor organization as a condition of em-
ployment as authorized in section 8(a)(3). 0
Pennsylvania's Act 195 closely parallels section 157 of the NLRA.
6 1
Section 1101.401 of Act 195 provides,
It shall be lawful for public employes to organize, form, join or
assist in employe organizations or to engage in lawful concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutu-
al aid and protection or to bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own free choice and such employes shall also
have the right to refrain from any or all such activities, except
as may be required pursuant to a maintenance of membership
provision in a collective bargaining agreement. 62
Section 1101.401 is Act 195's keystone guaranteeing employees' associ-
ational rights, 63 which are effectuated by an unfair labor practices sec-
tion.64 Specifically, section 1101.1201 (a)(1) provides that unfair labor
practices include "[i]nterfering, restraining or coercing employes in the
56. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.101-.2301 (Purdon Supp. 1977-78).
57. Id.
58. See notes 7-9 and accompanying text supra.
59. NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 256 (1975).
60. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
61. Id.
62. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101-.401 (Purdon Supp. 1977-78).
63. Id.
64. Id. § 1101.1201.
exercise of the rights guaranteed in Article IV [§ 1101.401] of this act.' 65
This language is similar to section 158(a)(1) of the NLRA, which pro-
vides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to
"[ilnterfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 7 [§ 157]. "' Specific public employer unfair
labor practices are enumerated in sections 1101.1201(a)(2)-. 1201 (a)(9)
of Act 19567 similarly to the approach adopted in the NLRA. 68 Violation
of any of these unfair labor practice sections also constitutes a derivative
violation of section 1101. 1201(a)(1). 69 Moreover, interference with sec-
tion 1101.401 rights that are not enumerated in the specific unfair labor
practice sections of Act 195 are, nevertheless, "independent" violations
of section 1101. 1201(a)(1). 7 ° These "independent" violations tradition-
ally encompass employer interference with organizational activities and
include coercive promises or threats designed to discourage union mem-
bership and elections, or the interrogation of employees about union
involvement. The specific "independent" violation dichotomy that exists
in Act 195 can also be found in the NLRA.
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Because of the similarity of sections 1101.401 and
1101.1201(a)(1) 72 of Act 195 to sections 157 and 158 (a)(1) of the
NLRA, 73 the Weingarten74 rationale may support the existence of the
union representation right in Pennsylvania's public sector. The public
employee who seeks union representation during a confrontation with his
employer may satisfy the literal language of section 1101.401 that "it
shall be lawful for public employes . . . to engage in . . .concerted
activities for the purpose of . . .mutual aid and protection." 75 The
employee seeks "aid and protection" against a perceived job security
threat. Union representation safeguards the interests of both the particular
public employee and his bargaining unit by ensuring that the public
employer does not initiate or continue unjust disciplinary practices.76
Union presence also assures other employees that they can obtain similar
assistance.
65. Id. § 1101.1201(a)(1).
66. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(l) (1970).
67. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ ll01.1201(a)(2)-.1201 (a)(9) (Purdon Supp. 1977-78).
68. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(2)-158(a)(5) (1970).
69. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1201(a)(1) (Purdon Supp. 1977-78).
70. Id § 1101.401, 1101.1201(a)(l)-.1201(a)(9).
71. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(l)-158(a)(5) (1970).
72. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.401, ll01.1201(a)(1) (Purdon Supp. 1977-78).
73. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(1) (1970).
74. NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
75. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.401 (Purdon Supp. 1977-78).
76. The quantum of proof that the public employer considers sufficient to support
disciplinary action is of concern to the entire bargaining unit. A slow accretion of custom
and practice may come to control the handling of disciplinary disputes. If, for example, the
public employer adopts a practice of considering his supervisor's unsubstantiated state-
ments sufficient to support disciplinary action, public employee protection against unwar-
ranted punishment is affected. The presence of a union representative allows protection of
this interest. Comment, 41 U. Cmt. L. REV. 329, supro note 26, at 338.
Section 1101.101 declares that the purpose of Act 195 is to promote
"orderly and constructive relationships between all public employers and
their employes" by "(1) granting to public employes the right to organize
and choose freely their representatives; (2) requiring public employers to
negotiate and bargain . . . ; and (3) establishing procedures to provide
for the protection of the rights of the public employe.. "77 Ideally, Act
195 is designed to eliminate unequal bargaining power between public
employers and employees. Since the employer who requires that employ-
ees attend investigatory interviews unaccompanied by union representa-
tives perpetuates the inequality Act 195 was intended to remedy, section
1101.401 may be construed to guarantee the public employee's union
representation right at investigatory interviews in which disciplinary risk
reasonably exists. 78
Although it appears that section 1101.401 alone supports the right, a
statutory basis for union representation may also exist under section
1101.606 .
79
Representatives selected by public employes in a unit appropri-
ate for collective bargaining purposes shall be the exclusive
representative of all the employes in such unit to bargain on
wages, hours, terms and conditions of employment: Provided,
That any individual employe or a group of employes shall have
the right at any time to present grievances to their employer and
to have them adjusted without the intervention of the bargain-
ing representative as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent
with the terms of a collective bargaining contract then in effect:
And, provided further, That the bargaining representative has
been given an opportunity to be present at such adjustment.8°
The union's presence at investigatory interviews, therefore, may possibly
be considered part of the union's duty as bargaining agent to enforce the
collective bargaining agreement's provisions and resolve "any questions
arising thereunder. " 81 It is a continuing relationship requiring each party
77. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.101 (Purdon Supp. 1977-78).
78. Id. § 1101.401.
79. Id. §§ 1101.401, 1101.606.
80. Id. § 1101.606. This provision of Act 195 is similar to § 159(a) of the NLRA, which
provides,
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by
the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the
exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of
collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or
other conditions of employment: Provided, That any individual employee or group
of employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their
employer and to have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the
bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the
terms of a collective bargaining contract or agreement then in effect: Provided
further, That the bargaining representative has been given opportunity to be
present at such adjustment.
29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
81. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.701 (Purdon Supp. 1977-78). Section 1101.701
defines "collective bargaining" for Pennsylvania's public employees:
Collective bargaining is the performance of the mutual obligation of the public
employer and the representative of the public employes to meet at reasonable times
and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours and other terms and condi-
to meet and resolve issues that arise during the life of the contract.
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The union representation right may be further buttressed by the
union's right to information needed to perform the bargaining obliga-
tion.83 Union representation at investigatory interviews enables the union
to prepare negotiation demands and facilitates contract enforcement.
Moreover, union presence alerts the bargaining agent to disciplinary
problems and assists later grievance processing.
2. Collective Bargaining by Policemen or Firemen's Act (Act
111).8-In sharp contrast to the provisions of Act 195,85 the Collective
Bargaining by Policemen or Firemen's Act (Act 111)86 lacks any proce-
dure regarding representation elections87 or unfair labor practices.
Moreover, Act 111 contains little, if any, language that parallels the
NLRA.8 8 Nevertheless, Act 111 is not devoid of statutory support for the
right to union representation at investigatory interviews. Section 217.1
declares that policemen or firemen "shall, through labor organizations or
other representatives . . . have the right to bargain collectively. . . and
shall have the right to an adjustment or settlement of their griev-
ances . ,"89 Thus, the right to union representation at investigatory
interviews may be justified under Act 111 as part of the union's general
bargaining duty.
Further statutory support for the right to union representation under
the terms of Act 111 results only if Act 111 can be read in pari materia9°
with the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act of 1937 (PLRA)91 to produce
a limited right to- concerted activity. 92 Although the Pennsylvania Su-
tions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement or any question arising
thereunder and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement
reached but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or
require the making of a concession.
Id.
82. For a discussion of the private sector's bargaining obligation, see Morris, The Role
of the NLRB and the Courts in the Collective Bargaining Process: A Fresh Look at
Conventional Wisdom and Unconventional Remedies, 30 VAND. L. REV. 661 (1977).
83. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.606 (Purdon Supp. 1977-78).
84. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 217.1-. 10 (Purdon Supp. 1977-78).
85. See notes 56-83 and accompanying text supra.
86. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 217. 1-. 10 (Purdon Supp. 1977-78).
87. See Philadelphia Fire Officers Ass'n v. Pa. LRB, 460 Pa. 550, 369 A.2d 259 (1977)
(supreme court noted deficiency of Act 111 in the representation area).
88. Act Ill contains no language that parallels § 157 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 157
(1970), or § 1101.401 of Act 195, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.401 (Purdon Supp. 1977-78).
89. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 217.1 (Purdon Supp. 1977-78). This language approxi-
mates that contained in § 1101.606 of Act 195, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.606 (Purdon
Supp. 1977-78), and in § 159(a) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
90. In pari materia is a technique of statutory interpretation meaning that ambiguous
legislative intent may sometimes be gathered from other statutes dealing with the same
subject matter. See generally 2A C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§
51.01-.08 (4th ed. 1973).
91. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 211.1-39 (Purdon 1968). This act created the Pennsylva-
nia Labor Relations Board (PLRB) and charged it with the responsibility of administering
private sector labor relations.
92. See id. § 211.5.
preme Court has determined that Act 1 11 must be read in pari materia
with the PLRA, at least to the extent of the PLRB's responsibility to
administer police and firemen representation elections, 93 this rationale
should not be invoked to interpret the specific language of Act 111 so
expansively 94
It is difficult to find a statutory basis for the right to union represen-
tation in the language of Act 111. Notwithstanding the absence of persua-
sive statutory authority, the right may nevertheless be justified for police
and firemen under the fairness or due process requirements applicable to
the grievance arbitration procedure.
B. NLRB Authority Supporting the Existence of the Right
No definitive PLRB ruling exists concerning the right to union
representation at investigatory interviews. The PLRB has, however,
decided that (1) no grievance may be adjusted without union presence ;95
(2) a corrective interview is not an investigatory interview from which
discipline may result;96 and (3) anti-union animus must be shown when
the right to union representation is denied.' In PLRB v. Pennsylvania
Department of Health and Welfare,98 the PLRB came close to acknow-
ledging the right's existence by finding that, because the employee was
ultimately accorded union representation, no unfair labor practice oc-
curred when a supervisor suggested that a different person be selected to
represent the employee at a grievance meeting than the person originally
chosen.99 Thus, it may be concluded that the PLRB recognizes some form
of the right. Nevertheless, the limited Pennsylvania case law and purport-
ed statutory bases for the existence of the right are far from clear.
C. The Right's Potential Operation in Pennsylvania
Public employees have the same rights as the general public to
challenge governmental regulatory actions. Until recently, however,
these employees have been denied an equivalent ability to effectively deal
with their employers. The United States Supreme Court has recognized
that the government, as an employer, can exert greater control over its
employees than it could over the public.100 The public employer's need
for wide control over its employees,' 0 ' however, must be weighed against
93. Philadelphia Fire Officers Ass'n v. Pa. LRB, 470 Pa. 550, 369 A.2d 259 (1977).
94. See Decker, The PLRB's New Jurisdiction for Police and Firemen, 16 DUQ. L.
REV. 185 (1978).
95. Pa. LRB v. Warwick Bd. of School Directors, 4 P.P.E.R. 146 (1974).
96. Pa. LRB v. Commonwealth, Polk State School & Hosp., 4 P.P.E.R. 74 (1974).
97. Pa. LRB v. Commonwealth, Philadelphia County Bd. of Assistance, 7 P.P.E.R.
213 (1976).
98. 5 P.P.E.R. 8 (1974).
99. Id.
100. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
101. In Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), it was stated that
the Government, as an employer, must have wide discretion and control over the
the employee's interest in union representation in personnel decisions
affecting assignment, promotion, transfer, discipline, and discharge.
1°2
A public employer's internal administration does not make it im-
mune to statutory, fairness, or due process requirements. Its discretion
cannot be merely subjective judgment, but must be controlled by clear
rules governing its actions. For example, welfare benefits cannot be
terminated, 10 3 parole revoked, 1°' or wages garnished 1°5 without estab-
lished reasons. Extending union representation rights to public employ-
ees, therefore, at the very least may make judgments over employee
problems more objective.
To protect both public employer and employee interests the right
should be accorded limited operation. A test is needed that gives a
reasonable accurate indication of the nature of a meeting without elabo-
rate inquiries into what might have been said or intended. The Weingar-
ten test does not provide an administrable method for determining when
the right to union representation can be requested.'06 It relies solely on the
employee's subjective, through reasonable, belief that discipline may
result.
The union and public employee are primarily interested in a union
representative's presence when a decision affecting the employee's job
rights may occur. Uncertainties can be reduced by requiring notice of the
meeting's purpose. If the notice indicates a disciplinary purpose, the
employee's right will be clear.
The test of whether an investigatory interview is disciplinary should
be its result and not the employee's belief. If discipline is imposed
immediately or shortly after an employer-employee confrontation, the
meeting should be characterized as disciplinary. The possibility that a
public employer will postpone discipline to evade a result test can be
dismissed as remote because it is against an employer's interest to retain a
delinquent employee or delay hiring a replacement.
The result test would solve the problems created when the public
employer claims that the meeting began as something else. It would
require the public employer to determine preliminarily the probability of
discipline. Even a small risk of nullifying disciplinary action is likely to
management of its personnel and internal affairs. This includes the prerogative to
remove employees whose conduct hinders efficient operation and to do so with
dispatch. Prolonged retention of a disruptive or otherwise unsatisfactory employee
can adversely affect discipline and morale in the work place, foster disharmony,
and ultimately impair the efficiency of an office or agency.
Id. at 168.
102. Frug, Does the Constitution Prevent the Discharge of Civil Service Employees?,
124 U. PENN. L. REV. 942, 991 (1976).
103. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
104. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
105. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). See also North Ga. Finishing,
Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974);
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
106. NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 256 (1975).
outweigh a union representative's inconvenience. This test encourages
the public employer to be honest about the meeting's purpose. The public
employer will, therefore, be motivated to allow union representation
whenever discipline seems probable or possible. 
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To facilitate the right's public sector operation by preserving em-
ployer and employee interests, the following should be considered:
1. The right arises only in interviews from which discipline may
result.
2. Whether a meeting is disciplinary should be determined by its
result. If disciplinary, the public employer should be required to
give the employee notice of the meeting's purpose.
3. The right arises only when the public employee requests it.108
4. Before the potentially disciplinary interview commences, the
employee should be permitted to consult with his union repre-
sentative if requested.
5. The exercise of the right should not be permitted to interfere
with legitimate public employer prerogatives.'19
6. The public employer has no duty to bargain with any union
representative permitted to attend the meeting and may insist on
hearing only the employee's version.
The above standards suggest a reasonable application of union representa-
tion rights for public employers and employees covered by Acts 195 and
111.
D. Failure to Accord the Right
The public employer's failure to accord the right when requested
may impair disciplinary action. This may occur through an arbitrator's
award" 0 or an unfair labor practice."' In all instances, the public em-
ployer's paramount interest should be the preservation of disciplinary
action from reversal. Consequently, the public employer may be wise to
accord the right even if it is only arguably guaranteed.
107. The result test was first suggested for the private sector. See generally 41 U. CHI.
L. REv. 329, supra note 26, at 345-47.
108. See note 34 and accompanying text supra.
109. The public employer (!) cannot be required to justify a refusal to allow union
representation; (2) may investigate without interviewing the employee; (3) may impose upon
the employee the choice of attending the interview alone or forgoing the interview and any
accompanying benefits; (4) cannot be required to postpone the interview because a particu-
lar union representative is unavailable; and (5) cannot be obligated to suggest or secure other
representation for the employee. See notes 30-45 and accompanying text supra.
110. For a discussion of the employer's failure, in the public sector, to accord represen-
tation rights upon request, see Metro Contracts Servs., 68 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 1048
(1977) (Moore, Arb.); Social Security Admin., 68 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 195 (1977)
(Lubow, Arb.); Town of Plainville, 67 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 442 (1976) (McKone,
Germjin, Zuilkowski, Arbs.). These cases indicate that the union representation right is still
in the developing stages in the public sector.
I11I. See notes 95-98 and accompanying text supra.
IV. Conclusion
The right to union representation at investigatory interviews has
already been acknowledged in the private sector. A corresponding right
for the public sector is particularly important for employers, employees,
and unions, since it relates to the continunity and overall functioning of
the grievance procedure. Recognition of this right, for which a statutory
basis may exist, need not disrupt operations if the right is properly limited
to situations in which disciplinary action could result
